Ten Sales Hires. Few Successes. Why Deep-Tech Founders Must Sell First.
The costly mistake is not hiring a bad salesperson. It is hiring a great one before your company knows how customers buy.
“We have hired around ten really experienced salespeople over five years, and not many have really succeeded, even though they were really good at their previous job.”
For Govinda Upadhyay, founder of SmartHelio, the lesson was expensive. His company develops software to predict faults in solar plants. Yet hiring proven sales talent did not automatically turn its technology into predictable revenue. “Even if you hired the best salesperson from a different sector, it’s not going to happen,” he says.
The paradox is familiar across business-to-business deep tech: the more innovative the product, the less useful a conventional sales playbook may be. Customers may not have a budget category, a clear owner for the problem, or an agreed way to assess the technology. A polished pitch cannot resolve those uncertainties. Someone has to discover the buying process first.
That person is usually the founder. Not forever—but long enough to turn a series of hard-won conversations into a process someone else can repeat.
The first customer meetings are product research in disguise
Early sales conversations do more than generate leads. They reveal which problem is urgent, who feels the cost of leaving it unsolved, who can release a budget, and what evidence convinces a cautious buyer. In deep tech, the gap between technical performance and a compelling commercial case can be enormous.
Mateusz Wojdylo of Stellos AG, whose software helps property owners manage and rent out parking spaces, entered real estate without industry experience. “We didn’t know the industry. I didn’t know the industry,” he recalls. “So we had to learn what those people’s daily problems are.” That learning could not simply be outsourced to someone hired to close deals.
At Tethys Robotics, which builds autonomous underwater robots, market feedback is deliberately fed into development. CEO Jonas Wüst describes the need for regular meetings to discuss what the team has learnt from customers. The point is simple: if sales and product teams learn separately, the company risks building an impressive technology that does not address the buyer’s most pressing concern.
Mark Leslie and Charles A. Holloway describe this dynamic as the “sales learning curve”. Their framework distinguishes initiation, transition and execution: different stages of commercial learning require different sales capacity and skills. Hiring a large sales team before the model is understood increases costs without making the product easier to buy. [1]
Practical move: After every substantial customer conversation, record four things: the problem in the buyer’s own words, the economic consequence, the people involved in approval, and the proof needed for the next step. Review these notes with the product team—not just the sales team.
The hiring question: Can anyone repeat what worked?
Founders often ask how many customers they need before hiring a salesperson. There is no universal threshold. Three customers buying for three unrelated reasons can signal experimentation, not repeatability. A more useful question is whether several similar buyers are following a recognisable path to purchase.
Upadhyay puts it clearly: “Once you have perfected that narrative, which is repeatable, and you know this thing works, that’s the time when you can hire other people.” The important word is repeatable—not perfect. You need evidence of a pattern, not a script that never changes.
Look for converging signals: customers in a clearly defined segment describe the same costly problem; they engage comparable stakeholders; they request similar proof; pricing and implementation no longer need to be reinvented for every deal; and a colleague can lead a discovery call without the founder rescuing the conversation.
Sometimes the strongest signal is a buyer who moves forward independently. At heyPatient AG, founded by Regula and Matthias Spühler, a customer once returned a signed contract by post and set up the product without assistance. That is one powerful anecdote, not proof of a scalable model—but it illustrates what happens when the value proposition becomes easy to understand and act on.
Pete Kazanjy’s Founding Sales makes the same fundamental distinction between discovering an initial sales motion and scaling it through hired sellers. A first sales hire should amplify a working hypothesis, not be expected to conjure product–market fit alone. [2]
Hire for discovery, not just an impressive CV
The first commercial hire at a deep-tech start-up may need to identify buyers, translate technical claims into business outcomes, build trust, navigate procurement and report product insights—sometimes all in the same week. A track record at a well-known company does not, on its own, demonstrate these capabilities.
Steve Blank famously warned against importing established-company job definitions into start-ups that are still searching for a business model. An executive skilled at executing a known process may struggle when the market, messaging and product keep changing. [3]
That does not mean experience is a liability. LatticeFlow AI, which helps organisations assess and govern AI systems, deliberately recruited seasoned commercial executives. CEO Petar Tsankov credits their previous experience with helping the company avoid mistakes, including around sales-channel choices. The distinction is relevance: experience with ambiguity and similarly complex enterprise buying is more valuable than prestige alone.
Nor must every capability be built in-house immediately. Risklick, which supports pharmaceutical companies developing clinical-trial protocols, worked with go-to-market and sales coaches through Innosuisse Start-up Coaching. Founder Dr Poorya Amini describes workshops in which they mapped the funnel and its bottlenecks. For a young team, external expertise can improve the system before a permanent hire increases fixed costs.
A better interview test: ask candidates to reconstruct a deal they won with no recognised brand or established playbook. Then stage a discovery call using a real prospective customer. Look for curiosity about stakeholders, risk and budget—not merely confidence in the pitch.
A new hire will not rescue this quarter’s revenue
Sales recruitment also needs realistic financial planning. A 2024 Bridge Group benchmark covering 172 B2B SaaS companies reported an average account-executive ramp time of 5.7 months. The sample largely represents established software businesses, so this is context—not a forecast for Swiss deep-tech ventures. Complex industrial procurement, trials, compliance reviews and integration may take substantially longer. [4]
The critical distinction is between ramp time and sales-cycle length. A salesperson may need months to become effective, and then additional months to carry a newly sourced opportunity through to signature. These periods can overlap; simply adding them gives a conservative planning scenario, not an empirical law.
Plan against cash, not optimism. Define what the hire can control in the first 30, 60 and 90 days—quality of discovery, stakeholder mapping, next-step commitments and progression of qualified opportunities—rather than measuring success only by immediate revenue.
The handover should look like an apprenticeship
The founder’s job does not end on a salesperson’s first day. Introductions, context and credibility have to be transferred. This matters particularly in markets where trust has developed over several technical discussions and where the initial contact is still two or three relationships away from a decision maker, as Tethys Robotics describes.
Start with shared accounts. The new hire observes discovery and technical meetings, then leads conversations with the founder present, and finally owns the relationship with the founder available for strategic or technical escalation. Keep account histories, decision criteria, open objections and agreed next steps in a shared system. A CRM full of names but empty of buying context is not a handover.
The same principle applies to distribution partners. Myriam Lingg of macu4, which produces 3D-printed prosthetic and orthotic devices, has seen different levels of enthusiasm among distributors. Her team seeks to understand why partners are motivated and equips them with materials they can use. A channel agreement does not eliminate the need to enable and learn from the people selling your product.
Only when conversion improves and an additional seller can plausibly contribute more gross profit than their fully loaded cost should the company accelerate hiring. That is a directional economic test, not a promise that every new hire immediately pays for themselves. [1]
A founder’s five-question readiness test
- Can we name a specific customer segment and a problem that buyers consistently prioritise?
- Have multiple customers paid for substantially the same value proposition—not just agreed to exploratory pilots?
- Can we map the buying committee, proof requirements, procurement steps and approximate sales cycle?
- Can a colleague run a credible first meeting and move an opportunity forward without us?
- Can we finance onboarding and a potentially long time to the first independently closed deal?
If several answers are no, keep founder-led discovery at the centre and use targeted help—coaches, technical sales support or business development—rather than immediately building a full sales organisation. If most are yes, start a structured handover, one account and one repeatable motion at a time.
The real milestone is not the hire
The ultimate goal of founder-led sales is to make the founder less indispensable without losing the customer understanding that made the first deals possible. SmartHelio’s experience is a reminder that accomplished sellers cannot reliably scale a story the company has not yet learnt to tell. The best time to hand over sales is when the business has turned founder intuition into shared evidence, useful tools and a buying journey the next person can navigate.
This week: Open your sales funnel. Highlight every opportunity that depends on a founder-only relationship or piece of knowledge. For each, write the next step needed to make the relationship transferable. That is where your first sales playbook begins.
About this series and sources
Part 5 of the Founders Hive go-to-market series, commissioned as part of the Innosuisse Entrepreneurship Training programme. Founder statements are drawn from interviews supplied for this series: SmartHelio (Govinda Upadhyay), Stellos AG (Mateusz Wojdylo), Tethys Robotics (Jonas Wüst), heyPatient AG (Regula and Matthias Spühler), LatticeFlow AI (Petar Tsankov), Risklick (Dr Poorya Amini) and macu4 (Myriam Lingg). Quotes have been retained from the supplied manuscript; original recordings/transcripts were not independently available for authentication.
- [1] Leslie, M. & Holloway, C. A. (2006), “The Sales Learning Curve”, Harvard Business Review, July–August. https://hbr.org/2006/07/the-sales-learning-curve
- [2] Kazanjy, P. (2022), Founding Sales: The Early-Stage Go-to-Market Handbook, edition e1.0.1. https://www.foundingsales.com/
- [3] Blank, S. (2010), “Job Titles That Can Sink Your Startup”, 13 September. https://steveblank.com/2010/09/13/job-titles-that-can-sink-your-startup/
- [4] The Bridge Group (2024), SaaS AE Metrics and Compensation Report, benchmark as cited in the supplied manuscript (172 B2B SaaS companies; average reported ramp 5.7 months). Underlying report not independently inspected; do not generalise the figure to deep tech.